When platforms study their own harms, they generate evidence that can later be used against them. That creates a perverse incentive to know less precisely when better measurement is most needed.

When internal company records become part of a legal fight, they can reshape how the public understands platform decisions. Subpoenas and unsealed filings often turn private risk analysis into public accountability.

When documenting harms creates legal and political risk, platforms have a reason to know less. Regulation has to be designed around that incentive problem rather than pretending it does not exist.

Digital antitrust cases often turn on a deceptively simple question: what market are we actually talking about? In tech, that question is harder than it looks because products, users, and business models do not fit neatly into old categories.

Antitrust cases against tech companies often take so long that the market changes before the court can rule. That timing problem can make even serious allegations much harder to prove.

Breaking up a tech company is not a slogan; it is a remedy with operational, legal, and political consequences. If regulators ever tried to unwind Meta’s past deals, the hard part would begin after the courtroom win.

Antitrust cases age badly when the market moves faster than the courtroom. By the time a trial begins, the hardest question is often no longer what happened, but what still matters.

Winning an antitrust case does not automatically tell a court what to do next. In tech, the hardest remedy question is often whether an old deal can realistically be pulled apart years later.

Practical steps researchers and small teams can take to sustain curiosity-led projects when traditional grants are reduced or reprioritised.

A practical look at which large-scale facilities are most exposed if UKRI narrows priorities, and how institutions and researchers can prepare.